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ST A TEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
l 02(3)U). 
INTRODUCTION 
The Stichtings' opening brief attempts to raise numerous issues never preserved 
below, discusses legal theories that are not in the operative pleadings, and recites alleged 
facts that were not included in the moving papers at issue. Despite the drawn out 
procedural history of this case, the remaining legal issues before the court are 
straightforward and the lack of evidence to support them a decade later is dispositive. It 
is time to put this case to rest. 
The Stichtings pursued only tvvo specific legal theories below-a public road 
claim under RS 2477 and a common-law prescriptive easement claim. For the public 
road claim, there is no question that the Stichtings had to prove that the public 
continuously used the Claimed Roads for at least five years-if not twenty years-before 
October 13, 1881. The district court properly entered summary judgment after finding 
that the Stichtings failed to provide any evidence of public use that could possibly satisfy 
their burden of proof, but alternatively the court could have entered summary judgment 
on any of the requisite elements of the public road claim. There is no evidence that the 
Claimed Roads even existed prior to 1901; and if there were, there is no evidence that 
any particular person used the roads; and if there were, there is no evidence that such 
person was acting as a member of the public; and ifthere were, there is no evidence the 
use was continuous instead of interrupted; and if there were, there is no evidence the use 
took place for the requisite time period prior to October 13 , 1881. In short, there is no 
evidence to support any of the elements of the Stich tings' public road claim under RS 
24 77, and they cite to none in their brief. The district court did not err in entering 
summary judgment. 
As for the prescriptive easement claim, the Stichtings did not raise below any of 
the facts, arguments, and authorities they now raise in their brief. In opposing summary 
judgment, they "did not include any additional evidence, but instead, referenced evidence 
summited by United Park." (R2563.) The evidence they now cite to as creating a 
disputed issue of fact as to adverse use was actually attached to documents filed later in 
the lawsuit, not to their opposition to the motion for summary judgment. On that ground 
alone, this court should affirm the entry of summary judgment. 
The remaining sections of the opening brief take issue with the district court's 
refusal to allow them to add a claim for an appurtenant easement nine years after they 
filed their original complaint and two years after the court, instead of dismissing their 
amended complaint as incoherent, provided them a final opportunity to raise any claim 
they wanted. There is nothing unusual or improper-let alone an abuse of discretion-in 
declining to allow an entirely new theory under these circumstances, especially after the 
close of discovery. This court should therefore affirm all of the orders of the district court 
now raised by the Stichtings on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Stichtings have not challenged any of the district court's Statement of 
Undisputed Facts in its Memorandum Decision and Order, dated October 1, 20 I 4 
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(R5965), which are set forth in relevant part as follows: 
Background. The Stichtings have come to own certain parcels of land near the 
top of Flagstaff Mountain south of Park City, which parcels straddle the Summit-Wasatch 
county line. (R5965.) These parcels were formerly old mining claims that were located 
and patented by prospectors in the latter decades of the 19th Century. (R5965.) United 
Park City Mines Company' owns simi lar property in the same area. (R5965.) 
The Stich tings claim that a network of public roads exists across United Park's 
land that would link the Stichtings' property with SR-224, the main road that leads from 
Park City over Empire Pass and from there to Midway or Guardsman Pass.2 (R5965.) 
While the Stichtings' property is not " landlocked," they seek to establish public roads 
from SR-224 to provide easier and more convenient access to their property. (R5965) 
United Park has developed portions of its property over which the Stich tings claim 
a road exists. Some of this development already exists. (R5965.) 
The Stichtings filed their original complaint in October 2005 (in case number 
050500500), alleging rights to a road over United Park's property. The complaint was 
terse, six pages long, and formally sought only a declaration of a prescriptive easement. 
1 The term "United Park" is used to refer collectively to all defendants/appellees 
because their positions are consistent for purposes of this appeal. 
2 The parties gave names to some segments of the roads. The "Pri mary Access Road" 
veers off, eastward, from SR-224 in the lower-right-hand corner of the map attached as 
Exhibit A to the district court's order. The "Flagstaff Loop Road" loops off of the 
Primary Access Road and around the former Flagstaff Mine. The Primary Access Road 
has two parts : the Lower Primary Access Road, and the Upper Primary Access Road, the 
upper portion of which stretches eastward beyond the Flagstaff Loop Road. 
The court used the phrase " Claimed Roads" to refer to all of the roads claimed by the 
Stichtings, including the Flagstaff Loop Road and the Primary Access Road. (R5965.) 
3 
(R5966.) The case languished for the first few years, with two orders to show cause due 
to inactivity. In what Judge Harris later described as moments of mercy, Judge Lubeck 
elected not to dismiss the Stichtings' case, eventually granting the Stich tings' motion to 
consolidate its case into another related case, Case No. 050500430. (R5966.) 
Motion for Judgment on Pleadings. After consolidation, the parties retained 
expert witnesses and conducted discovery. In December 2011, the Stichtings filed an 
amended complaint, which was not much longer or more detailed than the original 
complaint. (R5966.) United Park moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the 
allegations were inscrutable. The court (Judge Kelly) ruled that the claims were indeed 
"somewhat cryptic in nature and do not put [United Park] on adequate notice regarding 
what is claimed." (R1696.) As a consequence, on March 8, 2012 ("March 2012 Order") 
Judge Kelly ordered that Plaintiffs "make full and complete disclosures of their claims 
and evidence in this case" in writing, and that failure to do so "shall result in [the 
Stichtings] being unable to use the individual, document, or evidence in further 
proceedings." (RI 696.) Instead of dismissing the complaint, Judge Kelly ordered the 
Stichtings to "provide the specific statute or case law they allege supports their claim to a 
public or private road," and that failure to do so "shall result in [Plaintiffs] being unable 
to proceed with their claim." (R1696-97.) The Stichtings subsequently submitted a more 
detailed recitation of their claims, including (i) a common-law prescriptive easement 
claim, and (ii) a public road claim under an old post-Civil War statute known as "RS 
2477." (RI 854-59.) 
4 
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Summary Judgment on Prescriptive Easement. In May 20 12, after pre-trial 
disclosures, United Park moved for summary judgment. (R2563.) In their response, the 
Stichtings failed to comply with Rule 7 and did not specifically controvert United Park's 
statement of facts. (R2350.) Nor did the Stichtings provide any evidence to create a 
disputed issue of material fact. (R2350.) Instead, they included numbered paragraphs that 
corresponded to United Park 's statement of facts, and declared the facts to be "False" or 
"Irrelevant." (R2350.) In arguing that the Stichtings' use of the road was adverse, the 
Stichtings said only that the "[f]ailure to block the use is not consent." (R2352.) 
In reply, United Park pointed out that the Stichtings had not disputed testimony 
from their own witness that United Park had provided them permission to access 
"whatever road you want." (R.2390.) Noting that the "Stichtings did not include any 
additional evidence, but instead, referenced evidence submitted by United Park" in their 
opposition, the district court entered summary judgment on the prescriptive easement 
claim because "there is no disputed fact that Stichtings' access to the subject property 
was permissive." (R2563.) At that point, the only remaining claim in the lawsuit was the 
Stichtings' public road claim under RS 2477. 
Motion to Add a New Claim for Appurtenant Easement. In February 2014, the 
Stichtings retained new counsel who filed a motion seeking to add a claim for 
" appurtenant easement." (R2783.) The court denied the motion on two grounds. (R4837.) 
First, the court held that the Stichtings had failed to include a claim for an appurtenant 
easement in their pre-trial disclosures filed pursuant to the March 2012 Order. The claim 
was therefore barred by the terms of that order. (R4838.) Second, apart from the March 
5 
2012 order, the court stated that it was exercising its "discretion" to refuse to allow the 
belated second amendment. (R4838.) The com1 found the motion to be untimely because 
the "case has been pending for nine years." (R4838.) The court found no justification for 
the delay and refused to force the pa11ies to incur additional expense by moving discovery 
deadlines and re-opening discovery. (R4838.) 
Summary Judgment on the Public Road Claim. In February 2014, United Park 
moved for summary judgment on the Stichtings' sole remaining claim under RS 2477. 
(R5963.) The court granted that motion, based upon the lack of evidence. 
The Flagstaff Mine - Prior to 1871, the land near the summit of Flagstaff 
Mountain was part of the unsurveyed public domain of the United States. (R5968.) 
Sometime in 1871, a group of prospectors "located"3 a mining claim on Flagstaff 
Mountain that became the site known as "the Flagstaff Mine." (R5969.) 
The first of only two shipments of ore came from the Flagstaff Mine in July 1871. 
(R5969.) In field notes filed in 1872, the Flagstaff mining claimants asserted that they 
had made "two miles of road." (R5968.) Importantly, there is no indication of where this 
road was located, which two-mile stretch of road they were referring to, or who used it. 
(R5969.) Counsel for the Stichtings admitted at the hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment that they did not know the location of the roads in 1880. (R6098:96.) In fact, 
3 The "location" of a mining claim "is the initial step taken by the locator to indicate 
the place and extent of the surface which he desires to acquire. It is a means of giving 
notice. That which is located is called [in statute] and elsewhere a 'claim' or a 'mining 
claim.' Indeed, the words 'claim' and 'location' are used interchangeably." Del Monte 
Min. & Mill. Co. v. Last Chance Min. & Mill. Co., 171 U.S. 55, 74 (1898). (R5968 .) 
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the only direct evidence of those roads does not locate them where they presently lie. The 
Flagstaff mining claim was surveyed on December 11, 1872, and a very rough map 
sketch was included with that survey. (R5969.) Although a smal l unattached stretch of 
"road" is shown on that map sketch, it is not connected to any other road, and is in a 
completely different orientation from any of the roads at issue here. (R5969, 4034.) 
In 1873, the Flagstaff Mine claimants published notice of their application for a 
"patent"'' on the Flagstaff mining claim, and that patent was approved and issued by 
federal mining officials in 1876.5 (R5969.) At some point before 1874, several mining 
structures (including a log house and an ore house) were constructed at the Flagstaff 
Mine site. (R5969.) By 1875, the original ore strike at the F lagstaff Mine had been 
depleted, and a second shaft was sunk, which was rich enough to result in periodic ore 
shipments as late as 1881 , but not rich enough to keep a mill in business. (R5969.) 
Other Mining Activity in the Area - Many other mining claims were located in the 
v icinity during the 1870s and 1880s, including many owned by the Stichtings (including 
the Overlooked Fraction, Uncle Charles, Black Rock, and Blue Ledge), and many owned 
by United Park (including the Lucky Bill, Horne Station, and Peeler). (R5970.) 
4 
"A mining claim always starts out as unpatented. The owner must continue mining 
or exploration activities or it becomes null. A patented claim is one for which the federal 
government has issued a patent (deed). To obtain a patent, the owner must prove that the 
claim contains locatable minerals that can be extracted at a profit. A patented claim can 
be used for any purpose, like any other real estate. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 
U.S. 84, 86 (1985). 
5 This patented mining c laim is now owned by the Stichtings. (R5969.) 
7 
None of the field notes associated with any of the surrounding mining claims 
mentions work on the construction of any road. (R5970.) Indeed, the relevant field notes 
are silent with regard to how the claimants on these later-filed claims traveled to their 
claims. The furthest that any of the field notes goes is to include general language to the 
effect that prospectors traveled "southerly from Park City by wagon road." (R5970.) 
The roads at issue here cross the Lucky Bill, Home Station, and Peeler mining 
claims, all currently owned by United Park. (R5970.) These three claims were located 
between 188 1 and 1883. (R5970.) The first of these claims to be officially located was 
the Home Station claim, which was located on October 13 , 1881. (R5970.) The Lucky 
Bill claim was next, and was located on January 1, 1883. (R5970.) Finally, the Peeler 
claim was located on December 17, 1883. (R5970.) 
Use By People Other Than Prospectors - The record contains no direct evidence 
that anyone who was not a prospector, prior to 1900, used whatever roads were around 
Flagstaff Mountain. There were no homesteads on Flagstaff Mountain before 1912. 
(R5970.) There is no evidence that the public used the roads prior to 1900 for timber 
harvesting, livestock grazing, hunting, fishing, recreation, or any other purpose. (R5970.) 
Surveys and Maps - There are no maps or surveys issued prior to 1897 describing 
any roads that could possibly be the roads at issue here. (R597 l .) In 1897, the 
Government Land Office ("GLO") conducted a survey of the lands in the vicinity of the 
Flagstaff Mine. (R597 l .) The survey shows no road leading to the Flagstaff Mine, or any 
other road that could be any of the roads at issue here. (R5971, 4035.) 
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A couple of years later, the U.S. Geological Survey ("USGS") surveyed the entire 
Park City district, including Flagstaff Mountain, and issued a topographical map in 1901. 
(R597 l .) This map is the first map to depict a road leading east off of SR-224 near the 
top of Flagstaff Mountain and headed in the general direction of the Flagstaff Mine. But 
even that map does not indicate a road leading all the way to the Flagstaff Mine. (R597 l , 
403 7 .) It does indicate, however, a possible alternative route to access the Lucky Bill or 
Flagstaff Mines without passing over most of the roads at issue here, a fact that 
undermines the Stichtings' public road claim based upon these maps. (R597 1.) 
In 1950, the National Agricultural Imagery Program of the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture took aerial photographs of the area, including Flagstaff Mountain. (R5972.) 
Those photos are the first that depict the roads at issue here. (R5972.) In 1955 and 1998, 
the USGS prepared updated topographical maps, and those depict the roads. (R5972.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of United Park on 
the Stichtings' claims for a public road and prescriptive easement and refused to allow 
the Stichtings to add a claim for appurtenant easement nine years into this litigation. 
First, the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants 
on the Stichtings' public road claim. This was not even a "close call." See R6079. The 
court correctly concluded that the Stichtings could not prove by clear and convincing 
evidence (or even by a preponderance of the evidence) any "public use" of the Claimed 
Roads over United Park's land during the relevant time period. "There is not a shred of 
evidence of any kind that any such use occurred on these roads during the 1870s and 
9 
1880s." (R5988.) 
Additionally, numerous alternative grounds exist for the couri's ruling because the 
Stichtings failed to prove even a single element of their public road claim, including 
duration, frequency, continuity, and intensity of use during the relevant time. In fact, the 
Stichtings conceded that they do not even know the location of the Claimed Roads in 
1880. (R6098:96.) The first map showing some of the Claimed Roads did not appear until 
1901-a full 25 years after the Stichtings had to prove continuous public use of the 
Claimed Roads. There is no evidence that the Claimed Roads even existed during the 
relevant time period. There is no evidence that anyone ever used the Claimed Roads and 
did so continuously, intensively, and without interruption whether for five years or 20. 
The Stichtings' public road claim rests entirely on sheer speculation, which is fatal to 
their claim. 
Second, the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of United 
Park on the Stichtings' prescriptive easement claim after finding that there was no 
evidence of any adverse use of the Claimed Roads. The undisputed facts demonstrate 
that any use of the Claimed Roads was permissive and therefore no prescriptive easement 
could arise as a matter of law. Although the Stichtings cite to additional evidence in their 
brief that they contend demonstrates adverse use, they failed to present any of that 
evidence below in opposing summary judgment and cannot do so now on appeal. The 
Stichtings also did not seek reconsideration of this dismissal in their Rule 59 motion 
following dismissal of the public road claim. 
Third, the district court correctly denied the Stichtings ' motion to file a second 
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amended complaint to add a claim for an appurtenant easement after nine years of 
litigation, and the close of all discovery, and just 11 days before the deadline for filing 
dispositive motions. The court properly denied the motion as untimely, unjustified, and 
prejudicial. The court also correctly denied the motion after finding that the Stichtings 
fai led to include an appurtenant easement claim in their Pre-Trial Disclosures, which the 
court had ordered them to file in an attempt to remedy their defective amended 
complaint. In that order, the court unequivocally declared that the Stichtings would be 
barred from raising any claims not expressly disclosed in those Pre-Trial Disclosures. 
This Court should therefore affirm the orders of the district court challenged by 
the Stich tings on appeal and uphold the grant of summary judgment in favor of United 
Park on all claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IN FAVOR OF UNITED PARK ON THE PUBLIC ROAD CLAIM. 
The Stichtings' public road claim arises under a federal statute commonly called 
"RS 24 77." Enacted in 1886, RS 24 77 was a congressional, open-ended grant of "the 
right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public 
uses." S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt ., 425 F.3d 735, 761 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (hereinafter "SUWA") (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 932). RS 2477 remained in effect 
for over a century until repealed in 1976 under the Federal Land Policy Management Act 
(FLPMA). After repeal "any 'valid' RS 2477 rights of way 'existing on the date of 
approval'" ofFLPMA- October 21, 1976- would "continue in effect." Id. at 741. 
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As noted by the district court, the "starting point for trial courts as they determine 
how to navigate a case arising under RS 2477" is the case of Southern Utah Wilderness 
Alliance v. Bureau of Land Management, 425 F.3d 735 (l01h Cir. 2005) (hereinafter 
"SUWA") (R5974.) There is no question that "federal law governs the interpretation of 
RS 2477." Id. (quoting SUWA, 425 F.3d at 768). However, "in determining what is 
required for acceptance of a right of way under the statute, federal law "bonows" from 
long-established_principles of state law, to the extent that the state law provides 
convenient and appropriate principles for effectuating congressional intent." Id. 
( emphasis added)). When determining whether an RS 24 77 highway has been accepted 
in Utah, couris must look "to Utah law in force at the time the right of way was claimed 
to have been accepted." Id. (quoting SUWA, 425 F.3d at 771 (emphasis added)). 
Here, the land over which the Claimed Roads pass was removed from the public 
domain on October 13, 1881, when the Home Station mining claim was officially 
located. (R5877.) So, the Stichtings must prove acceptance of the Claimed Roads by 
1881. To do so, the Stichtings bear the burden of proving "(1) continuous use (2) by the 
public (3) for the requisite period of time." (R5979.) 
A. The Requisite Time Period was Twenty Years in 1881. 
In 1881, there was no Utah statute establishing the requisite time period for 
proving dedication of a road by public use. In the absence of a governing statute, the 
requisite time period is determined by looking to Utah common law. See Vogler v. 
Anderson, 89 P. 551,552 (Wash. 1907); Burrows v. Guest, 12 P. 847, 847 (Utah 1886). 
12 
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In Harkness v. Woodmansee, 26 P. 291 (Utah 1891 ), the Utah Supreme Court 
plainly declared that "right to a public road" by "dedication" arises only after "twenty 
years" of "uninterrupted adverse enjoyment." Id. at 292.6 This 20-year period had been 
the law in Utah since the nineteenth century. Funk v. Anderson, 61 P. 1006, 1007-08 
(Utah 1900). The Stichtings were therefore required to prove use of the Claimed Roads 
for 20 years by 1881. As a matter of law, the Stich tings cannot prove 20 years of use 
during a nine-year period. This court can affinn on that ground alone. 
Rather than looking to Utah common law for the requisite time period, the district 
court instead improperly applied a five-year time period set forth in an 1880 statute that is 
entirely inapplicable to public road claims arising through dedication by public use. That 
statute provides as follows: 
Sec. 2. Highways are roads, streets or alleys and bridges, laid 
out or erected by the public, or if laid out or erected by others, 
dedicated or abandoned to the use of the public. 
Sec. 3. Roads laid out and recorded as highways by order of 
the County Court, and all roads used as such for a period of 
five years, are highways. 
1880 Laws of Utah, ch. XXIX ( emphasis added). Although Section 2 expressly claims to 
public roads dedicated through public use, the district court instead applied Section 3 and 
the five-year period set forth in Section 3 of the statute and effectively imported it into 
Section 2. Yet, Section 3 does not apply to roads created through dedication by public 
6 A lthough the issue before the Court in the Harkness case was a claim for a private 
prescriptive easement, rather than a public road by dedication, the Court unambiguously 
stated that the 20-year requirement applied to claims of a public road by dedication 
through use. Id. 
13 
use at all. Rather, as the Idaho Supreme Court noted when interpreting Idaho's 
enactment of the same statute, Section 3 is better read as creating an additional means of 
establishing a public highway if the road is both (i) erected by the public or expressly 
dedicated to the public, and (ii) is recorded by the county court and used by the public for 
five years. Galli v. Idaho County, 191 P.3d 233, 239 (Idaho 2008). As another coUii 
explained, "[t]o qualify as a highway under Idaho's road creation statutes during the 
relevant period of time, Eagle Creek Road must have been designated as such by the 
Shoshone County Board of Commissioners and regularly used by the public for five 
years." County of Shoshone v. United States, 912 F. Supp. 2d 912, 928-29 (D. Idaho 
2012), (emphasis added). Here, the roads were not recorded by the county court, so the 
five-year option set forth in Section 3 simply does not apply. 
The Idaho coUiis' interpretation of this identical statute gives literal effect to all 
provisions in the statute. In contrast, the Stichtings' interpretation ignores the plain 
language of the statute, improperly conflates Sections 2 and 3 of the statute, renders the 
second clause of Section 3 superfluous, and is contrary to the rules of statutory 
interpretation. Because Section 3 of the 1880 statute is inapplicable, the coUii e1Ted in 
applying the five-year time period to this case. 
Instead, the 20-year common law period must be applied to the Stichtings' public 
road claim. Because there is no evidence of continuous public use of the roads beginning 
in 1861-twenty years before the Home Station mining claim was located- the 
Stichtings' public road claim fails as a matter of law. This couri can affirm on that ground 
alone. 
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But even if the five-year period applied, the result is the same. Under Section 3 of 
the 1880 statute, the Stichtings had to prove that the claimed roads existed between 1976 
and 1881, and were used continuously, by the public, during that five-year period. 
(R5982.) As demonstrated below, they cannot meet their burden to satisfy any of those 
elements. 
B. The Stich tings' Burden of Proof Was Clear and Convincing Evidence. 
The district court correctly held that the Stich tings ' burden of proof was clear and 
convincing evidence but that they could not meet their burden of proof even if it were 
only preponderance of the evidence. 
There is no dispute that, in October 188 1, the burden of proof for RS 2477 
claimants in Utah was clear and convincing evidence. Instead, the Stichtings argue that, 
over 120 years later, the Utah Legislature lowered the burden of proof for RS 24 77 cases 
from clear and convincing evidence to preponderance of the evidence when it enacted the 
2003 Utah Rights-of-Way Across Federal Lands Act, Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-301 et seq. 
("Act"), which provides in relevant part as follows: 
The proponent of the R.S. 2477 status of the highway bears the 
burden of proving acceptance of the grant by a preponderance 
of the evidence for all decisions that are not subject to 
Subsection (6)(a). 
Id.§ 72-5-3 10(6)(b). 
The district court properly rejected the Stichtings' argument. First, the court noted 
that the Utah federal district court faced a virtually identical argument and "declined to 
apply the provisions of the Act- at least not provisions that impacted the burden of 
15 
proof-to modern RS 2477 adjudications." (R6077) (citing San Juan County v. United 
States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58460, * 17-18 n.9 (D. Utah May 27, 2011), afl'd 754 F.3d 
787 (10th Cir. 2014) (hereinafter "Salt Creek District Court Case"). Noting that 
"( w ]hether the R.S. 24 77 grant has been accepted is a question of compliance with the 
then-existing laws of the state where the right-of-way was established," the Salt Creek 
court observed that the Legislature had not enacted the Act until 2003-"many years 
after the opportunity to accept the R.S. 24 77 grant had been terminated by Congress." Id. 
Accordingly, the Salt Creek court held that the Act was a "post-hoc" attempt to "alter the 
burden of proof concerning the acceptance of R.S. 24 77 rights-of-way" and refused to 
apply the burden-of-proof provisions of the Act to RS 2477 claims. Id. Here, the district 
court likewise held that the burden-of-proof provisions of that Act could not be applied to 
alter the Stich tings' burden of proof under RS 24 77 a century later. Id. 
The Stichtings attempt to distinguish the Salt Creek District Court Case by 
arguing that a different provision of the Act was at issue in that case. Because both 
provisions would alter the burden of proof if applied to RS 24 77 cases, the district court 
rightly found no basis for distinguishing the Salt Creek District Court Case and instead 
found "the analysis of the federal court instructive here, certainly as to provisions of the 
Act that might "attempt[] to alter the burden of proof' that would have applied to 
establishment of RS 24 77 claims on or before October 21 , 1976. (R6078); accord San 
Juan County , 754 F.3d at 799 (refusing to apply Utah law to RS 2477 cases to the extent 
it would "retroactively broaden the public's eligibility for R.S. 2477 rights-of-way 
beyond what Congress could have intended to preserve.") 
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Second, the district court correctly found that Subsection (6)(b) of the Act has 
absolutely no relevance to the facts of this case regard less. (R6078.) By its terms, 
Subsection (6)(b) applies "mere ly to specific proceedings challenging 'the correctness of 
any acknowledgment of acceptance' that may be created or recorded by the State of Utah 
notifying interested parties that the State of Utah considers 'title of the right-of-way' as 
having 'vested[ed] in the State of Utah." Id. (quoting Utah Code Ann.§ 72-5-309(1), -
310(2)(a)). As the court noted, the relevant subsection appears in a statute concerning the 
State of Utah's acknowledgment of acceptance of a right of way under RS 2477, 
something that did not happen here." 
If this statutory Subsection were a stand-alone provision, its 
context may look different. But when this provision appears 
as just another Subsection of a lengthy statutory provision 
describing a specific and discrete type of adjudicatory 
proceeding. in the Court 's view this Subsection appl ies not to 
RS 2477 lawsuits generally but. rather, only to the specific 
actions described in Section 3 10 of the Act ( e.g., petitions filed 
to challenge the correctness of one of the State of Utah's 
notices of acknowledgment). 
(R6079) ( emphasis added). Where a notice of acknowledgement has not been issued, as 
here, section 72-5-310 simply does not apply. 
Confirming this, section 72-5-310(6)(b) applies only to "decisions that are not 
subject to Subsection (6)(a) ." The relevant section reads in its entirety: 
(6)(a) In accordance with Section 72-5-302, a rebuttable 
presumption that the R.S. 2477 grant has been accepted is 
created when: (i) a highway existed on public lands not 
reserved for public uses as of the cut-off date under Section 
72-5-301; and(i i) the highway currently exists in a condition 
suitable for public use. 
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(b) The proponent of the R.S. 2477 status of the highway 
bears the burden of proving acceptance of the grant by a 
preponderance of the evidence for all decisions that are not 
subject to Subsection (6)(a). 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-310. The presumption in (6)(a) applies only where the highway 
existed on public lands as of 1976. But if the claimed right of way does not involve a 
highway on public lands as of 1976, the proponent must prove acceptance of the grant in 
the face of a challenge to the "notice of acknowledgement" sent by the governor. The 
preponderance of the evidence standard in (6)(b) has no application here because no 
"notice of acknowledgment" has been issued. 7 
Finally, regardless of the burden of proof, the district court correctly held that the 
Stichtings failed to meet that burden. 
Even if the burden of proof to be applied in this case were 
preponderance of the evidence. the result would not be any 
different. Plaintiffs would still bear this burden of proof-
something that can in and of itself, be 'decisive' in RS 2477 
cases- and, on the evidence presented Plaintiffs would not be 
able to surmount even this lessened burden. 
(R6079-80) (emphasis added). This court could therefore choose to clarify this issue or 
hold, as the Tenth Circuit has done, that "[b ]ecause the judge correctly concluded the 
evidence of the existence of a public thoroughfare failed to satisfy either the more lenient 
'preponderance of the evidence' standard or the more stringent 'clear and convincing 
7 If the Stichtings were correct about the applicability of the Act, then the time period is 
ten years, not five. Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-301 (1 )(b) (requiring "use by the public for a 
period in excess of 10 years.) 
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evidence' standard, we need not resolve the dispute over the proper standard." San Juan 
County, 754 F.3d at 801. Either way, this court should affirm. 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded that the Stichtings Failed to 
Prove "Public Use." 
The district cour1 canvassed 60 years of state and federal case law in rightly 
determining that a single purpose use of a claimed road was insufficient as a matter of 
law to constitute public use for purposes of RS 2477. (R5985-87.) In Lindsay Land & 
Livestock Co. v. Churnos, 285 P. 646 (Utah 1929), the Utah Supreme Court first raised 
the issue of whether a single purpose use of a claimed road could constitute "general 
public use of the road" sufficient to establish a public thoroughfare. (R5986.) The Court 
noted that the claimed road had been used by a wide cross-section of the public, including 
sheepherders, people visiting a sawmill in the vicinity, members of the "general public" 
who traveled the road "extensively ... in going to and from [a nearby] mining camp," 
and "hunters, fisherman, and others who had occasion to travel over it." See id. ( quoting 
Churnos, 285 P. at 647). The Churnos Court ultimately found that there was a public 
road due to such extensive public use but specifically cautioned that " [i]f the claim rested 
alone upon the use of the road for sawmill purposes, or for mining purposes, or for the 
trailing of sheep, the question would be more difficult." Id. (emphasis added). 
The Stichtings erroneously construe this language in Churnos as having 
conclusively "established that a single purpose R.S. § 24 77 road could be deemed to be a 
public road through continuous use." (Br. at 18.) Yet, as the district court rightly 
observed, the issue of whether a single purpose use could quali fy as a public use was "left 
19 
open in Churnos" because the road at issue there was extensively used by a wide variety 
of people for a wide variety of purposes. (RS 987.) 
The issue was again flagged in the SUWA case. Quoting the above language from 
Churnos, the court pointedly declared that"[ w ]e think it significant that the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that if the claim rested 'alone upon the use of the road for sawmill 
purposes, or for mining purposes, or for the trailing of sheep, the question would be more 
difficult." SUWA, 425 F.3d at 773 (emphasis added). The court then noted that "old 
mining and logging roads constructed for a particular purpose and used for a limited 
period of time" are not the same as roads used "by the general public." Id. at 771 
(emphasis added). The SUWA court furiher observed that "[l]arge parts of southern Utah 
are crisscrossed by old mining and logging roads constructed for a particular purpose and 
used for a limited period of time, but not by the general public." Id. at 781-82 ( emphasis 
added). 
Then, in the Salt Creek District Court Case, the Utah federal district couri cited 
SUWA and concluded that a road used only by cattlemen did not constitute a "public use" 
as required for dedication of an RS 24 77 road. (R5990-91.) The Stich tings attempt to 
distinguish this case by claiming that it was the "minimal use" of the road that dictated 
the result, not the limited purpose of the use. (Br. at 20.) The evidence in the case 
however, was that three different cattle operations had used the road for over 60 years. 
That is not minimal use. 
Moreover, citing to Churnos, Cassity v. Castagna, 347 P.2d 834,835 (Utah 1959), 
Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 116 P.2d 420 (Utah 1941), and Boyer v. Clark, 326 P.2d 107 (Utah 
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195 8), the Salt Creek court noted that "in each of those cases, the RS 24 77 grant was 
found to have been accepted by continuous public use of the claimed road for more than 
ten years by various persons and for varying purposes." Salt Creek District Court Case, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58460, *34-35 (emphasis added). Further, on appeal, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the decision and declared that, as Churnos demonstrated, 
"frequency and variety of use were critical common-law inquiries into the acceptance of 
an R.S. 2477 right-of-way." San Juan County, 754 F.3d at 799 (emphasis added). The 
Stich tings' contention than none of these cases turned on the lack of variety of use is 
baseless. 
Tellingly, the Stichtings have not cited to even one state or federal case where any 
court found that a single purpose use of a claimed road was found to constitute "public 
use" sufficient to create an RS 24 77 road. To the contrary, the plethora of state and 
federal cases cited by the district court clearly supports and even dictates the court's 
conclusion in this case that use of a road for a single purpose does not constitute "public 
use" as required dedication of an RS 24 77 road. The district court therefore rightly 
concluded that the question of whether a single purpose use qualifies as public use "has 
been defin itively answered in the negative by the Utah Supreme Court, both in the cases 
following Churnos, and by the Utah federal district court in the Salt Creek District Court 
Case." (R5989.) 
The district court also correctly concluded that use by mining prospectors and 
claimants does not constitute "public use" under RS 24 77. The Stichtings do not dispute 
that locators, patentees, and claimants had proprietary rights in their mining claims and 
2 1 
that their use of any roads to reach those claims would not constitute public use under RS 
24 77. (Br. at 20-21.) The Stich tings also concede in their brief that use of roads by 
"invitees" or other permissive users does not constitute "public use" for purposes of RS 
2477. See Br. at 19-20. Prospectors were nothing more than invitees of the federal 
government. As noted by the Stichtings in their brief, "the Mining Law of 1872 
effectively granted to all citizens and prospective citizens of the United States ... a right 
of entry onto public land. See Br. at 23 (citing 1872 Mining Law§ I, R.S . § 2319, 30 
U.S.C. § 22) (emphasis added). It "allowed any citizen of the United States to become a 
prospector" over federal public land. (Br. at 24.) Therefore, all prospecting done on 
Flagstaff Mountain while it was in the federal public domain was done with the express 
authorization of the federal government and was therefore a permissive use. 
Utah courts have repeatedly found that permissive use does not qualify as "public 
use." In Heber City Corp. v. Simpson, 942 P .2d 307, 311 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme 
Court declared that "use by permission does not constitute use as a public thoroughfare." 
Id. In San Juan County, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals quoted Heber City and 
declared that "[t]o demonstrate the existence of a public thoroughfare, a claimant must 
show: '(i) passing or travel, (ii) by the public, and (iii) without permission.'" San Juan 
County, 754 F.3d at 797 ( emphasis added). Because prospecting upon federal public land 
during the time period at issue was expressly contemplated and authorized by federal law, 
any such use would clearly be a permissive use and would not qualify as a public use 
under RS 24 77 as a matter of law. 
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Even if use by prospectors could constitute public use, there is no evidence of such 
use. The only evidence of any use of any road during the relevant time frame is a 
reference to two ore shipments from the Flagstaff Mine in 1871 and 1872 by the Flagstaff 
Mine claimants by an unknown route. There is no evidence that those two shipments used 
a road at issue here, and even if there were, that use would not constitute public use. As 
the district court recognized, "[t]here is no direct evidence that anyone else ever used 
these roads, prior to 1881, for homesteading purposes, for timber-gathering purposes, for 
livestock grazing, for hunting or fishing, or for recreational pursuits." (R5988.) More 
emphatically, there is not "a shred of evidence of any kind that any such use occurred on 
these roads during the 1870s and 1880s." (R5988.) 
The Stichtings contend that the court drew improper inferences against them 
regarding the "success of the prospectors roaming the mountains around Park City in the 
late 19th century and the number of users of the Flagstaff Road." (Br. at 24.) But the 
district court did not draw such an inference. It ruled that whether the individuals using 
the roads "were prospectors, locators, claimants, or patentees makes no difference" 
because they were all engaged in the activity of "mining." (R6082.) 
Regardless, there is no evidence that prospectors used the roads at issue here. To 
assert the contrary, the Stich tings point to a master's thesis from 1971 for the proposition 
that there were "more than 500 men prospecting in the hills around Park City as early as 
1872." (Br. at 25 ( emphasis added).) From this, the Stich tings infer that those prospectors 
used the roads at issue here. But the larger quote from the thesis reveals that it does not 
provide a sufficient basis for that inference: 
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(R.629-30.) 
By 1872 there were probably 500 or more men prospecting and 
working in the hills above Parley's Park. An area of six square 
miles contained the Walker and Webster, the Pinyon, the 
Ontario, the McHenry, the Red, White & Blue, the Pioneer, and 
the Flagstaff Mines. At the Ontario and the McHenry, sleeping 
quarters had been erected by the companies to house the men 
they employed. 
Of all of the mines mentioned, only the Flagstaff Mine has any relevance here. 
(R5303.) And given that the area in question was "six square miles" and contained at 
least seven other mines-two of which had sleeping quarters erected-no reasonable 
inference could be drawn as to how many of the alleged prospectors were located in the 
vicinity of the Flagstaff Mine, much less what roads they used. 
Even if such an inference reasonably could be drawn, the result is the same. 
Again, the thesis claims only that alleged prospectors were in the hills by 1872-it says 
nothing about the years following, which are the critical years here. As described in 
detail above, there is no possible evidence of any actual use of any road to the mine after 
1872. Based on the undisputed evidence in the record, it is simply not reasonable to 
infer from a single, speculative and unsubstantiated sentence in some thesis anything 
about actual use of the Claimed Roads during the relevant time period. It is impossible to 
extrapolate from a general reference to prospectors in the area "by 1872" how many 
prospectors, if any, were on Flagstaff Mountain from 1872-1881 , much less whether any 
of those prospectors ever actually used the Claimed Roads or to what extent, or even 
whether the Claimed Roads actually existed at the time the alleged prospectors were 
presumably wandering somewhere above the hills of Park City 
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In short, there is no evidence of prospectors using the roads at issue, let alone 
evidence of prospectors who did not become locators, claimants, or patentees, as the 
Stichtings admit they must show to prevail. Moreover, any such inference would be 
" insufficient to constitute clear and convincing evidence of public use." Id. "The 
heightened pleading standard has to mean something, and if it could be satisfied with this 
sort of unsupported inference, it would be rendered utterly meaningless." Id. Even under 
a lesser preponderance of the evidence standard, the Stich tings could not prove public use 
given the utter lack of evidence regarding public use. (R6079-80.) Therefore, based on 
the undisputed facts in the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, 
the district court correctly concluded that the Stichtings could not meet their burden of 
proving public use of the Claimed Roads during the relevant time period and properly 
granted summary judgment to Defendants. 
D. The District Court's Grant of Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants 
is Sustainable on Multiple Alternative Grounds. 
Although the district court ruled that the Stichtings fai led to prove public use, 
there are multiple alternative grounds on which this Court can easily sustain the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, as the court observed in its 
decision. (R005987 n.7; R5992 n.9.) 
" It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if 
it is susta inable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record." Peak Alarm Co. 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2010 UT 22, ~ 76,243 P.3d 122 1. On this record, the Stichtings 
failed to provide evidence of any of the requisite elements of their public road claim. 
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No Evidence the Roads Existed - First, there is no evidence that the Claimed 
Roads even existed between 1876 and 1881, only speculation. Under Utah law, 
"speculation is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of a 
summary judgment motion." Glover By & Through Dyson v. Boy Scouts of Am., 923 P.2d 
1383, 1388 (Utah 1996); Gildea v. Guardian Title Co., 970 P.2d 1265, 1270 (Utah 1998) 
("Such speculation falls short of creating a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to 
survive summary judgment."). 
The Stichtings cite three facts in their brief as suppo1i for their claim that the roads 
existed during the relevant time periods, none of which actually supp01i that claim. First, 
the Stichtings point to a non-specific reference to "two miles of road" in the 1872 
Flagstaff field notes, but fail to cite any evidence that the referenced road was located 
where they now contend the Claimed Roads were located. (Br. at 33.) The Stichtings' 
failure in that respect is unsurprising, as the map accompanying the reference to "two 
miles of road" does not depict any of the roads at issue here, but does depict a road in a 
different location. (R5969, 120; 4034.) In fact, there are no maps showing the location of 
the "two miles of road" between 1876 and 1881, let alone showing that it shares the 
location of the current roads. 
Second, the Stichtings point to the field notes for other claims that make no 
mention ofa road. (Br. at 33.) It is difficult to understand how this absence of evidence 
supp01is their claim, especially where the only map in 1872 depicts a different road. 
(R5972, 1 32.) 
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Third, the Stichtings contend that the "historical records show that the location of 
the F lagstaff Road has not changed in more than one hundred years." (Br. at 33 .) But that 
hardly matters. Even a hundred years does not reach back to 1901, when a map for the 
first time depicts some of the roads at issue here. (R5972, 11 31-32.) No previous map 
depicts any of the roads. Moreover, the 1901 map "depicts a possible alternative route, 
leading off of SR 224 at a much lower point that would have allowed prospectors to 
access the Lucky Bill of Flagstaff Mines without passing over most of the Claimed 
Roads." (R5304.) There is simply no way of determining which, if either, of these routes 
might have been the road to the F lagstaff Mine in 1871. Because there is no evidence to 
establish what roads were actually used by the prospectors in the 1870s, a factfinder 
could not find for the Stichtings on this point without resorting to impermissible 
speculation. 8 Without evidence that the Claimed Roads even existed during the relevant 
period, the Stichtings cannot prove their public road claim.9 
8 A factfinder could not draw an inference in favor of the Stich tings based on the 
circumstantial evidence of possible road use in the 1870s. A reasonable inferences cannot 
be drawn from circumstantial evidence if that "evidence is as consistent with the fact 
sought to be proved as with its opposite." Dept. of Econ. Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 
924 F. Supp. 449, 474 (S .D.N.Y. 1996); see also Kaer v. Mayfair Mias., 43 1 P.2d 566, 
569-70 (Utah 1967) (affirming JNOV in favor of store owner where inference drawn by 
jury from circumstantial evidence that store owner caused dangerous condition was not 
reasonable) ("[T)here was testimony at trial that others were shopping in the aisle. It is 
quite possible that one of them dropped the grape on the floor after the manager passed 
by."). 
9 On appeal, the Stichtings continue to argue that they can satisfy their burden with 
the absence of evidence, asserting that for the district court to have entered summary 
judgment, it had to find " that the public did not use the Flagstaff Road between 1872 and 
1880." (Br. at 35 .) The Stich tings have to prove their claim. Neither United Park nor the 
court has to disprove their claim. 
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No Evidence of Actual Use - Second, the Stichtings cannot show that anyone 
used the Claimed Roads, even assuming those roads existed in 1871. The only evidence 
of use consists of one shipment of ore from the Flagstaff Mine in 1871 and another in 
1872. Yet even those shipments are unhelpful because there is no evidence the shipments 
traveled any of the Claimed Roads instead of alternative roads depicted on the same maps 
on which the Stich tings rely. 
Otherwise, the Stichtings' evidence consists only of their speculation that there 
must have been prospectors who used the roads. Specifically, the Stichtings cite to a 
number of other mining claims on Flagstaff Mountain and speculate that prospectors 
must have used the roads at issue to reach these claims. (Br. at 33.) Yet of the seven 
mining claims cited by the Stichtings, only one had been located by 1881, so their 
speculation is beside the point. (R5294-97,5970.) Further, there are no production records 
or mining logs for any of those mining claims in the record and no evidence that any ore 
was ever transported. In short, there is no evidence of use of any roads by anyone to 
access any of those mining claims or any others prior to 1880. 
No Evidence of Continuous Use - Third, the Stichtings cannot show continuous 
use. 'Continuous' in this context means 'without interruption."' San Juan County, 754 
F.3d at 797. There is no evidence of any actual use prior to 1880, much less evidence of 
continuous, uninterrupted use. As in the Salt Creek District Court Case, "there is no 
specific evidence of recurring monthly use by anyone." Salt Creek District Court Case, 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58460, at * 124 n.90 ( emphasis in original). 
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The Stich tings have provided no evidence for any element of their public road 
claim. They have no evidence the roads existed. They have no evidence that anyone used 
the roads. And they have no evidence that anyone who did use the roads used them 
continuously. Thus, even assuming that the five-year- instead of the twenty-year-time 
period applies, the Stichtings' claim fails as a matter of law. The district court therefore 
properly granted summary judgment in favor of United Park. 10 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO UNITED PARK ON THE PRESCRIPTIVE 
EASEMENT CLAIM. 
The Stich tings also challenge the district court's 2012 order granting summary 
judgment in favor of United Park on the Stich tings' prescriptive easement claim. The 
Stichting's arguments fail for several reasons. 
w The Stichtings' arguments regarding alternative access to their property are 
irrelevant on appeal because the district court never reached that issue below. The 
question of whether the Stich tings had alternative access to their property arose solely in 
the context of their claim to a private access easement over the Claimed Roads, which 
required them to prove that the Claimed Roads were public roads under RS 2477. 
Because the district court found that they could not so prove, it never reached the issue of 
whether the Stichtings retained a private access easement in any alleged abandoned 
public road over Defendants ' land. 
To claim a private access easement, the Stichtings would in any event have had to 
prove that it was "necessary for ingress and egress to and from property" and that any 
"alternative access imposed measurable hardship that was unreasonable under the 
circumstances." Mason v. State, 656 P.2d 465, 469 (Utah 1982). It is undisputed that 
"Plaintiffs' property is not ' landlocked'; that is, there is another way to reach Plaintiffs' 
property from another direction." (R5965.) The Stichtings never challenged this fact. 
The issue of alternative access was not a "new theory," as the Stichtings now 
contend. (Br. at 36.) Rather, Defendants submitted proof of alternative access to negate 
one of the elements the Stichtings were required to prove under their private access 
easement theory. 
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First, the Stichtings simply did not preserve the issues they now raise in their brief. 
Utah appellate courts will not consider an argument raised on appeal unless it was 
"presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial comi has an opportunity to rule on 
it." In re A. T., 2015 UT 41, ii 9 (quotation omitted). To present the district comi with an 
opportunity to rule, "(l) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be 
specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority." Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ii 14, 48 P.3d 
969. 
The Stichtings did none of this. As noted in the August 16, 2012 Order, "[i]n their 
opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Stichtings did not include any additional 
evidence," and, with respect to the prescriptive easement claim, did not even reference 
any of the evidence submitted by United Park. (R2563). In fact, the Stich tings did not 
cite to a single piece of evidence or a single disputed or undisputed fact in opposing 
summary judgment on their prescriptive easement claim. Yet, under Rule 56(e), they 
were required to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Cowen & Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109, 113-14 
(Utah 1994) (concluding that Rule 56(e) foreclosed appellant from raising new issues and 
facts in opposition to summary judgment on appeal). 
None of the evidence that the Stichtings now cite in their appellate brief was ever 
mentioned in any of the summary judgment memoranda. The majority of the record cites 
now appearing in the Stichtings' appellate brief are to exhibits that were attached to a 
summary judgment motion filed two years after the court's order dismissing the 
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prescriptive claim. That motion had nothing whatsoever to do with any prescriptive 
easement claim because it had been dismissed two years earlier. For example, nowhere 
in the summary judgment proceedings did the Stichtings' ever claim, as they do now, that 
Mr. Theobald "beg[ a]n the prescriptive period by accessing the property without 
permission." Nowhere did the Stichtings claim there were no gates or fences or cable 
denying access to the Stichtings' property when Mr. Theobald began visiting the 
property. Nowhere did the Stichtings claim that they continued to access their property 
after the cable was installed or that they never sought the combination from United Park. 
Even the claim that Mr. Theobald obtained the combination from Deer Valley, 
United Park's lessee, and not directly from United Park, is newly raised. Although 
testimony to that effect was included in exhibits that were attached to the summary 
judgment motion, neither party referenced that testimony in their summary judgment 
briefs, so it was never brought to the attention of the district court. All of this evidence is 
being raised for the first time on appeal. 
The Stichtings also failed to raise any of the legal arguments or authority they now 
raise on appeal with respect to adverse use. In their opposition to United Park's motion 
for summary judgment, the Stichtings included only three sentences in defense of their 
prescriptive easement claim: 
The gist of "adversity is that the use was maintained under 
claim of right. Heber City v. Simpson, 942 P .2d 307, 3 11 (Utah 
1997); Morris v. Blunt, 161 Pac. 11 27, 1131 (Utah 1916). 
Failure to block the use is not consent. Certainly, where the 
use is previously established by the public, or by prior private 
owners, fai lure to block the use is irrelevant. 
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(R2342.) At best, this spare passage preserved for appeal the issue of whether United 
Park had an affirmative duty to block Mr. Theobald's access in order to foreclose the 
Stichtings' prescriptive easement claim, which they have abandoned on appeal. 
Even if this court were to consider the new issues raised in the opening brief, it 
should affirm. To establish a prescriptive easement under Utah law, a claimant must 
establish that their use of another's land was"( I) open, (2) notorious, (3) adverse, and ( 4) 
continuous for at least 20 years." Lunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192, ~18, 186 P.3d 978 
(quotation omitted). Each of the above elements must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence. Id. 
The district comt ruled that the Stichtings cannot establish "adverse" use as a 
matter of law. Under Utah law, a use "cannot be adverse when it rests upon license or 
mere neighborly accommodation." Green v. Stans,fzeld, 886 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) (quoting Lunt v. Kitchens, 260 P.2d 535, 537 (Utah 1953)). In addition, "where a 
person opens a way for the use of his own premises, and another person also uses it 
without causing damage, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, such use by the latter 
is permissive." Buckley v. Cox, 247 P.2d 277, 279 (Utah I 952) (listing cases). 
Once permissive use is established under one of the above mechanisms, "[a] 
permissive use cannot become adverse without notice to the owner of a change in use." 
Green, 886 P.2d at 120. If a use is permissive at the outset, a claimant must make a 
"distinct assertion of a right hostile to the owner," bring that assertion "to the attention of 
the owner, and then continue the use "for the full prescriptive period." Id. ( quotation 
omitted). In Gash/er v. Peay, 2006 UT App 4, 12 (unpub.), the court affirmed summary 
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judgment on the basis that the claimant had "clearly not shown that their use ever became 
adverse." 
In the present case, Mr. Theobald testified that United Park initially took the 
Stichtings on a guided tour of the area and gave the Stich tings permission to 
"basically ... use whatever road you want." (R2121.) In opposing summary judgment, 
the Stichtings did not dispute that United Park permitted the Stichtings to use the roads. 
(R2387.) 11 It is also undisputed that the Stichtings only used the roads that had been 
opened on United Park's property in the same way as United Park, and without causing 
damage. Accordingly, the Stichtings' use was both actually and presumptively permissive 
under Utah law. The Stichtings did not present any evidence of a subsequent and timely 
"distinct assertion" of any change in that use. Under these circumstances, the Stichtings 
cannot establish adversity as a matter of law. 
Further, the Stichtings' assertion that this case "min-ors" Crane v. Crane, 683 P .2d 
1062 (Utah 1984) is unfounded. (Br. at 51 , 53-54.) Although the claimants in Crane were 
able to establish a prescriptive easement claim even though the landowners had provided 
them a key to access the road at issue, there are no other similarities between the present 
case and Crane. After the claimants in Crane had already used the road at issue for well 
more than the prescriptive period (1936 to 1953), the landowners installed a locked gate 
across the road and informed claimants that they intended to block future use. Crane, 683 
11 In their opposition, the Stichtings argued that United Park had no choice but to 
permit the Stichtings to use the roads because they were public roads. Id. They did not 
argue that their use was non-permissive. 
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P.2d at 1065. The claimants immediately informed the landowners that they had a right to 
use the road (presumably because they had already used the road for 30 years), and that 
they would break down the new gate. Id. The landowners subsequently provided the 
claimants a key. Id. Over the next 30 years, although the landowners continued to attempt 
to block the claimants' access, the claimants persisted in their use of the road, sometimes 
by cutting through the fence, sometimes by "saw[ing] the gate in two," and sometimes by 
using a key. Id. at 1066. This court affirmed the district court's grant of prescriptive 
easement, highlighting the testimony that the claimants asserted a right to use the road in 
the 1950s and "forced their way through the fence or gate when they did not have a key 
during the period from 1950 to 1980." Id. 
Although Crane demonstrates that it is possible to establish a prescriptive 
easement when the landowner provides a key to a locked gated, it does not support the 
Stichtings' assertion that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to adversity in this 
case. Unlike Crane, there is no evidence that the Stichtings timely asserted a right to use 
the roads at issue under a claim ofright after United Park installed a gate in the early 
1990s. There is no evidence that the Stichtings used the roads at issue for a full 
prescriptive period prior to the installation of United Park's gate in 1990. And there is no 
evidence that the Stichtings forced their way through United Park's gate for a period of 
30 years in order to access the roads at issue. This court should disregard the Stich tings' 
attempt to analogize their claim to Crane . 
The Stichtings' contention that they are entitled to a presumption of adverse use 
under Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998) is also equally misguided. 
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(Br. at 51.) The presumption does not apply here for several reasons. First, the Stichtings' 
use was permissive at its inception because United Park "open[ed] the way" under 
Buckley, 247 P.2d at 279 and because the Stichtings' use rested upon a "neighborly 
accommodation" under Green, 886 P.2d at 120. Second, the Valcarce presumption only 
applies "once a claimant has shown an open and continuous use of the land under a claim 
of right for the twenty-year prescriptive period." Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 311 -1 2 . 
The Stichtings cannot also establish "continuous" use for a twenty-year period as a 
matter of law. To be considered "continuous," a claimant must establish that their use 
was not " inten-upted by the owner of the land across which the right is exercised." 
Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc., 5 59 P .2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977) ( quotation omitted). Here, 
Mr. Theobald testified that he began using the roads as needed when the Stichtings 
acquired the property in " late '70s, early '80s," at which time "there were no gates or 
fences." (R3367-68.) United Park then installed posts and a cable lock across the road 
approximately ten years later in " 1990 or something." (R3369.) Because this inten-uption 
and reassertion of ownership undisputedly occurred before the prescriptive period had 
run, the Stich tings cannot establish continuity as a matter of law by clear and convincing 
evidence. 12 This cou1i should affirm the court's ruling on the prescriptive easement claim. 
12 This Stichtings' main case, Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 1062 (Utah 1984), is 
distinguishable on this point as well because the claimants in Crane had been using the 
road at issue for approximately thirty years prior to the landowner's installation of a 
locked gate across the road. Id. at 1065-66. 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE STICHTINGS' 
MOTION TO AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT. 
The district court properly exercised its broad discretion in denying the Stichtings' 
Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint in 2012 to add an appurtenant 
easement claim because the motion was untimely, unjustified, prejudicial and directly 
contrary to the prior orders of the court. The power to grant or deny leave to amend "lies 
within the court's discretion" and will not be disturbed "unless the court has exceeded its 
discretion and prejudice results." Jones v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT App 355, ~ 7, 
78 P.3d 988. 
A. The Stichtings' Attempt to Add an Appurtenant Easement Claim Was 
Untimely, Unjustfied, and Prejudicial. 
It is well established that motions to amend may be denied if they are "untimely, 
unjustified, and prejudicial." Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, 
~ 58,221 P.3d 256 (internal citations omitted). "Trial courts are not required to find all 
three factors to deny a motion to amend; a court's ruling on a motion to amend can be 
predicated on only one or two of the particular factors." Id. 
First, the district court correctly found that the Stichtings' motion "does not meet 
the case law elements that would support a motion to amend at this juncture of the case" 
because the motion was untimely. (R4836.) "Untimely motions are those filed in the 
advanced procedural stages of the litigation process." Daniels, 2009 UT 66, ~ 59 (internal 
citations omitted). 
The Stichtings filed their Motion to Amend on February 10, 2014- nine years 
after litigation commenced, three months after the parties had exchanged expert reports, 
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and just 11 days before the deadline for filing dispositive motions. The fact discovery 
deadline had also closed for the second time five months earlier, so there would be "more 
time and expense required to address the claim" and "move discovery deadlines and 
reopen discovery to allow the defendants a chance to address the amended claims." 
(R4836.) 
The deadline to amend pleadings had also long since passed. In fact, a year before 
the Stichtings filed their most recent motion to amend, the court expressly stated in its 
March 26, 2013 Scheduling Order that amendments "will not be permitted" because the 
deadline to amend pleadings had already passed. (R2710.) The Stichtings' motion was 
unquestionably filed in the advance procedural stages of the litigation process and was 
therefore untimely. 
In their brief, the Stichtings do not challenge the court's denial of their motion due 
to untimeliness. They argue only that there was no excessive delay or undue prejudice. 
(Br. at 49.) Because the court's denial of the Stichtings' motion can be predicated solely 
upon a finding of untimeliness, the district court's denial of the Motion to Amend is 
sustainable on that basis alone. 
Second, the motion was unjustified. The Stichtings provided no reason for their 
delay in seeking to amend their complaint, other than the fact that they had hired new 
counsel. But that hardly constitutes justification. In fact, far from explaining why they 
did not discover their claim until 2012, they incorrectly claim that it was in play all along. 
(Br. at 47-48.) 
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Third, the motion was prejudicial. Motions are prejudicial when the nonmoving 
party would have little time to prepare a response before trial." Daniels, 2009 UT 66, ~ 
59. Ignoring this standard, the Stichtings argue merely that United Park would not have 
required additional discovery on the new claim. (Br. at 49.) They contend that the 
historical evidence already in the record was all that United Park would need to defend 
themselves against the new claim. Yet, the elements of an appurtenant easement claim 
are drastically different than those of an RS 24 77 claim, requiring proof of "(i) unity of 
title followed by severance; (ii) an apparent, obvious, and visible servitude at the time of 
severance; (iii) that the easement is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of severed 
property; and (iv) the easement must be continuous and self-acting." See Adamson v. 
Brockbank, 185 P.2d 264,272 (1947). Aside from the requirement of continuous use, 
none of the elements overlap the public road claim. Additional discovery would have 
been required for each. After nine years of litigation, United Park surely would have 
been prejudiced by allowing the Stichtings to essentially start the case over again. 
In a similar case, Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, i! 60, 
a plaintiff appealed denial of his motion to amend to add a new claim, which the trial 
court had denied as untimely and prejudicial because it would have required the 
reopening of discovery. Although acknowledging that "the trial date was distant and that 
United Park might have had sufficient time to prepare a response to the claim of 
fraudulent concealment," the Utah Supreme Couri nevertheless refused to reverse the 
denial of the motion to amend, holding that it must "defer to the trial court's 
determination that the additional claim would have prejudiced the Defendants" because 
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the trial court "is best positioned to evaluate the motion to amend in the context of the 
scope and duration of the lawsuit." Id. This Court must likewise give "considerable 
deference" to the district court's determination in this case that granting the Stichtings' 
motion would cause prejudice to United Park. 
B. The Stichtings' Attempt to Add an Appurtenant Easement Claim Was 
Contrary to the Prior Orders of the Court. 
i. No Appurtenant Easement Claim in the Stichtings' Pre-trial Disclosures 
The district court also properly denied leave to amend because the Stichtings had 
failed to disclose a claim for appurtenant easement in their Pre-Trial Disclosures. On 
December 22, 2011, United Park filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, 
seeking dismissal of the Stichtings' public road claim under Rule 12(c). Although the 
Stichtings purportedly amended their complaint to add a public road claim, the only claim 
was for "Declaratory Relief - Prescriptive Easement" and no public road claim was 
alleged. (Rl 561-62.) The court agreed with United Park and expressly found that the 
Stich tings' complaint was "somewhat cryptic in nature and [ did] not put United Park on 
adequate notice regarding what is claimed." (Rl682.) 
The court further noted that it was "concerned that United Park be afforded due 
process with respect to the allegations in the Stichtings' First Amended Complaint," but 
rather than dismissing the defective complaint, the court instead gave the Stichtings a 
second bite at the apple and ordered them to file Pre-Trial Disclosures in order to 
"ameliorate the effects of the fom1 of the Amended Complaint." See id. Specifically, the 
court ordered as follows: 
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Stichtings shall make full and complete disclosures of their 
claims and evidence .... Such disclosures shall be made 
notwithstanding any prior disclosures, shall be made in 
writing, and shall not incorporate other disclosures or materials 
by reference .. .. 
For each roadway claimed, Stichtings shall provide the specific 
statute or case law they allege supports their claim to a public 
or private road. Failure to provide such information by the date 
set forth herein shall result in Stichtings being unable to 
proceed with their claim under Utah R. Civ. P. 37. 
(R4837) (quoting March 8, 2012 Order). The Stichtings took full advantage of the 
court's further leeway and, without objection, filed their Pre-Trial Disclosures on March 
23, 2012. 
Nowhere in their Pre-Trial Disclosures did the Stichtings even mention the words 
"appurtenant easement," much less recite the elements or cite to any case law concerning 
appurtenant easements. (Rl 856-62.) The court therefore correctly determined that the 
Stichtings "did not include a claim for an appurtenant easement nor identify any case law 
or statute in support of such a claim" and consequently required them "to stick to what 
they have in the 2011 Amended Complaint as clarified by the March 23, 2012 Pre-Trial 
Disclosures." (R4838) (emphasis added). 
The Stichtings now protest that their Pre-Trial Disclosures did include a "full and 
complete disclosure" of an appurtenant easement claim in compliance with the court's 
order. In a footnote, they quote references to a "private right of access to adjoining 
lands" and the like, and attempt to argue that these references are to an appurtenant 
easement. (Br. at 48 n.5.) In reality, those references pertain to a so-called "private 
access easement" over a public road, whereby a "landowner whose property abuts a 
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public road possesses, by operation of law, a private easement of access to that prope1ty 
across the public road." See Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431,437 (Utah 1993). A 
private access easement over a public road is an entirely different legal theory and claim 
than an appmtenant easement, which becomes an issue when property is severed and 
does not exist merely by virtue of being adjacent to a public road. 
ii. No Appurtenant Easement Claim in the Stichtings' Amended Complaint 
The Stichings also contend that even if they did not adequately disclose an 
appurtenant easement theory in their Pre-Trial Disclosures, the court erred in denying 
their motion to further amend their complaint to add that claim because the appurtenant 
easement claim appears in their Amended Complaint. That argument is directly contrary 
to the district court's findings in its March 8, 20 12 Order, wherein the court expressly 
found that the complaint "did not put United Park on adequate notice regarding what is 
claimed." (RI696.) The Stichtings have not appealed those findings and therefore 
cannot pursue that argument on appeal. Moreover, the Defendants had no idea that the 
Stich tings were claiming an appurtenant easement. Tellingly, nowhere in any of the 
multiple dispositive motions filed by the parties in this nine-year case did any party ever 
mention any appurtenant easement claim. 
Furthermore, the Amended Complaint is irrelevant in light of the March 2012 
order. In that Order, the Comt expressly precluded the Stichtings from relying on "any 
prior disclosures" or even "incorporate[ing] other disclosures or materials by reference." 
See RI 696, 1 1. Instead, the Stichtings were required to affirmatively disclose all of their 
"claims and evidence" in their Pre-trial Disclosures to give the Landowners sufficient 
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notice of exactly what it was the Stichtings were claiming in their pleadings. Id. The 
entire purpose of that requirement was to prevent the Stichtings from doing exactly what 
they have now attempted to do-bootstrap new claims into the lawsuit at this last minute, 
whether by trying to point to vague or inapplicable allegations in the Stichtings' 
Amended Complaint, or otherwise. 
iii. Pre-Trial Disclosure Requirement Within Court's Discretion 
The Stichings also attempt to evade the requirements of the district court's March 
2012 Order by claiming for the first time that it was improper and exceeded the court's 
power and authority. The Stichtings never raised or preserved this issue below. On page 
five of their opening brief, the Stichtings claim they preserved this issue in their 
memoranda in support of their motion to amend and at the hearing on that motion, but the 
Stich tings did not challenge the court's authority to enter the March 2012 order anywhere 
in those pages. The Stichtings even filed an objection to the March 2012 Order but never 
questioned the Court's authority to issue the order or require clarifying disclosures. 
(Rl 828-32.) Nor did they challenge the court's authority to require the disclosures in 
response to the United Park's motion to strike the Stichtings' summary judgment motion 
or the United Park's opposition to their motion to amend the complaint, both of which 
were premised in significant part on the March 2012 Order. The Stich tings had 
numerous opportunities to raise this issue time and again, and instead said nothing. 
Having taken full advantage of the opportunity given them by the court to salvage their 
flawed Amended Complaint, they now tum on the court and challenge its authority 
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simply because their Pre-Trial Disclosures were as deficient as the amended complaint 
they were intended to cure. 
In requiring Pre-Trial Disclosures, the district court acted within the broad 
discretion bestowed upon courts to manage their dockets. Welsh v. Hosp. Corp. of Utah, 
2010 UT App 171, ~ 9,235 P.3d 791 ("Trial courts have broad discretion in managing 
the cases assigned to their courts.") In its March 2012 Order, the court cited to Rules 16 
and 26 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as the basis for the order and specifically 
stated that it was "exercis[ing] its case management authority and prerogative under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 16(b)." (Rl696.) Rule 16(b) allows courts to include in scheduling orders 
"any other matters appropriate in the circumstances of the case." Utah R. Civ. P. 16(b) 
(pre-2011). In its Order, the district court described in detail the "circumstances of the 
case" that warranted the clarifying disclosures required therein, namely, that the amended 
complaint did not give adequate notice to Defendants of the claims asserted against them. 
Furthermore, all of the information that the court required to be disclosed via its 
March 8 Order was information that the Stichtings were already required under the Rules 
to disclose, either in its amended complaint, its initial disclosures, or its pretrial 
disclosures. Rule 26 specifically requires identification of documents, exhibits, and 
witnesses. The Stich ti ngs acknowledge that "while parts of the March 2012 Order were a 
valid exercise of the District Court's authority under Rule l 6(b ), ordering Mayflower to 
disclose its legal theories, supporting facts, case law, and statutes, was not." (Br. at 45 .) 
Yet, this is the very information that the Stichtings were required to set forth in their 
amended complaint in order to put Defendants on notice of what was being claimed. 
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They consistently failed to do so. The district court acted within its power and discretion 
in ordering the Pre-Trial Disclosures. 
The Stichtings also contend that the future sanction of exclusion set forth in the 
March 2012 Order for failure to comply was somehow improper. They argue that the 
sanction was "self-executing instead of requiring a hearing and showing of non-
compliance." (Br. at 45.) That simply is not true. The March 2012 Order specifically 
states that the imposition of the sanction would be conditioned on non-compliance with 
the Order; therefore, a showing of non-compliance was expressly required as a 
prerequisite to any exclusionary sanction. In fact, the only "enforcement" of the 
threatened sanction came after a hearing, where the parties presented arguments about the 
Stichtings' failure to comply with the March 2012 Order. (R4837.) No sanction in the 
March 2012 Order was self-executing or was ever enforced in such a way. 
iv. No Prejudice as a Result of the Pre-Trial Disclosure Requirement 
The Stichtings suffered absolutely no prejudice as a result of the March 2012 
Order. To the contrary, the court effectively saved the Stichtings' defective amended 
complaint by giving the Stichtings the opp01iunity to ameliorate its defects through filing 
clarifying Pre-Trial Disclosures. The Stichtings embraced this opportunity with nary a 
whimper until the district court found that its Pre-Trial Disclosures were likewise 
deficient. 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that the March 2012 Order expressly 
warned the Stichtings that they would be precluded from using any witnesses and 
documents that they failed to disclose in their Pre-Trial Disclosures, such was not strictly 
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the case. As acknowledged by the Stichtings, the district court "tempered the 
restrictions" of the order and did not exclude a single witness or document that was not 
disclosed in the Pre-Trial Disclosures. (Br. at 46.) As for the appurtenant easement 
theory, the Order merely served as an alternative ground, and not the sole ground, for 
denying the Stichtings' motion to add that claim at the last minute, as described above. 
Thus, the Stichtings cannot show any prejudice resulting from the March 2012 Order. 
In contrast, if the Court were to refuse to enforce the March 2012 Order and allow 
the Stichtings to proceed with claims that were not included in its Pre-Trial Disclosures, 
United Park would be significantly prejudiced. They have fully relied on the Stichtings' 
Pre-Trial Disclosures iri conducting discovery, briefing dis positive motions, and 
defending against the Stichtings' claims. United Park would be greatly prejudiced if the 
Stichtings were now allowed to proceed with a new appurtenant easement claim after 
relying on the district court's assurances that only claims fully and completely disclosed 
in the Stichtings' Pre-Trial Disclosures could proceed. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of United Park on 
the public road c laim and prescriptive easement claim. The district court also acted 
within its broad discretion in refusing to allow the Stichtings to add an additional claim 
nine years into the litigation as untimely, prejudicial, and contrary to the prior orders of 
the court. This court should affirm. 
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46 
• 
• 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24(f)(l) 
I. This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Utah R. App. 
P .24( f)( I) because this brief contains 13 ,237 words, excluding the parts of the brief 
exempted by Utah R. App. P. 24(f)( I )(B). Counsel relies on the word count of Microsoft 
Word. 
2. This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P.27(b) 
because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft 
Word 97 in 13 point Times New Roman. 
Nicole M. Deforoe 
Attorney's or Party's Name 
Dated: July 22, 2015 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEES to be mailed, postage prepaid, this 22nd day of July, 2015 to: 
Craig C. Coburn 
Steven H. Bergman 
Brad M. Liddell 
RICHARDS BRANDT MILLER NELSON 
299 South Main Street, 15th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
47 
Addendum A 

ADDENDUM 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Mining Act of 1866, § 8, R.S. § 2477, 43 U.S.C. § 932 
"The right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved 
for public uses, is hereby granted." 
General Mining Act of 1872, § 1, R.S. § 2319 
"All valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States, both 
surveyed and unsurveyed, shall be free and open to exploration and purchase, and the 
lands in which they are found to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States 
and those who have declared their intention to become such, under regulations prescribed 
by law, and according to the local customs or rules of miners in the several mining 
districts, so far as the same are applicable and not inconsistent with the laws of the United 
States 
1880 Laws of Utah, ch. XXIX 
Sec. 2. Highways are roads, streets or alleys and bridges, laid out or 
erected by the public, or if laid out or erected by others, dedicated or 
abandoned to the use of the public. 
Sec. 3. Roads laid out and recorded as highways by order of the 
County Com1, and all roads used as such for a period of five years, are 
highways. 
Utah Code Ann.§ 72-5-310 
(6)(a) In accordance with Section 72-5-302, a rebuttable 
presumption that the R.S. 2477 grant has been accepted is created when: (i) 
a highway existed on public lands not reserved for public uses as of the cut-
off date under Section 72-5-30 1; and(ii) the highway currently exists in a 
condition suitable for public use. 
(b) The proponent of the R.S. 2477 status of the highway bears the 
burden of proving acceptance of the grant by a preponderance of the 
evidence for all decisions that are not subject to Subsection (6)(a). 
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